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This paper enlightens the antecedences triggered by the governance based mechanisms upon 
the performance of the listed firms at Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). For this purpose, one of the 
heavily contributing industries of Pakistan, the textile spinning industry has been targeted. The firms 
indulged within the process of empirical estimation were listed at KSE for the period of 2009 to 
2017. Sources of the data were annually audited financial statements published by firms, Balance 
Sheet Analysis (BSA) and Financial Statement Analysis (FSA) published by the State Bank of Pa-
kistan (SBP). The framework of study undergone descriptive analytical reasoning followed by the 
panel data methodological approach, utilizing fixed effect methodological adaptations at major. The 
results deduced that the governance based mechanisms carved by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP), upon an aggregate level, affected positively and significantly the 
performance of listed firms. 




Overall performances evinced by the firms eventually points towards the extent of which the 
set of mechanisms are being adopted. Invariable performance wangled by the institution will expli-
citly be fraternized by the corporate governance mechanisms espoused by the firm itself. These me-
chanisms are so to be known as the governance tools. Steady or unsteady outcomes exhibited by 
firms eventually points towards the adoptability to the body of mechanisms associated with the cor-
porate governance (Iskander and Chamlou, 2000). 
The Organization of Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) explained the corpo-
rate governance that it indulges the framework dealing efficiency and transparency among the mar-
ket structure, where consistently prevailing law and order situations and articulation of responsibili-
ties associated by the authorities are submerged without any discrimination (OECD, 2013). 
Primarily, the study figures multi-dimensionally, the functionalities of the set of governance 
based mechanisms yielding their impacts upon the performances of the firms. Corporate governance 
is a tool that gradually mechanizes the corporate formation to be managed, merged, organized, and 
to be operated in a way that all the stakeholders under an institution collectively collaborate and 
contribute towards the uplifting of their nascent institutions (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
This study unfolds a broader concept of economic prosperity where the governance based 
mechanisms capitulates the performances of firms, thus jointly collaborates and contributes to as-
semble the healthier economic conditions for the country. The performance of an industry is solely 
beholden by the deliberate performances of its constituent firms. Individual performance of the 
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Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
Before 1999, Corporate Law Authority (CLA) was the sole authority to regulate domestic 
business activities after that Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) replaced CLA by holding 
all the authorities and responsibilities. The SEC became sole authority recognized for the capacity 
enhancement, making the firm strategies and the implementation to the policies carved by consider-
ing corporate laws (SECP, 2014). 
Aims of Study 
1. The study aims to explore different dimensions of corporate governance structure and the 
performance of firms. 
2. This study aims to unfold the relationship between adoptability of corporate governance 
structure and exhibited performances of the firms.  
 
Literature Review 
There is a broader shelf of literature defining the corporate governance but the concept 
slightly differs individually. Higher payoffs eventually unbolt the way toward innumerable oppor-
tunities including capacity building, enhancement of capabilities, strengthening of mechanisms that 
guarantee the ultimate achievements to the firms (Gillan, 2006).  
The corporate governance mechanisms are the actual practices made by the governance au-
thorities by keenly utilizing the mechanisms of governance frameworks (Nam et al., 2004). These 
are the practices that eventually help gaining the confidence of both the investors and the market it-
self (Denis and McConnell, 2003). 
The application of governance based mechanisms uplifts the performances of firms. These 
elevated performances upon ultimately contributes in the uprising of an industry, thereby inducing 
the performance of an economy (Duca, 2015). 
The parameters reflecting the performances of firms points toward the backend utilization of 
set of mechanisms. (Wn et al., 2014). The board meetings including the size of the board, larger the 




The selection of the firms for the purpose of empirical estimation, was based upon the con-
sistency and the availability of the concerning firms that is generally known as the non-probability 
sampling technique specifically evolved for the purpose of data collection. The best fit firms to the 
criteria were selected.  
Data Collection 
The study assessed the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm’s 
performance of listed companies at (KSE). Data were collected from annual reports published by the 
listed companies and the Balance Sheet Analysis (BSA) published by the State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP) respectively. The study examined the data consisted of the 40 shortlisted firms for the years 
2009 and 2017.  
Outlook to Variables 
The study at hand utilized two sets of variables.  
Performance of the Firms 
For the sake of identification to the performance of the listed firms, the variables constructed 
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Table 1: Firm’s Performance 
Variables Symbols Description 
Return on Assets ROA Profitability of a firm relative to the total assets 
Source: Authors Own Calculations 
 
Table 1 indicates the variable representing the performance exhibited by the firms, Return on 
Assets (ROA). The variable ROA is the actual profitability of the firms with respect to the assets 
declaration by that consequent firm.  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Table 2 represents the variables indicating governance of the firm were the Board Size 
(BODS), Board Remunerations (BRUM), Audit Committee Members (ACM), Auditor’s Remunera-
tions (ARUM), Annual General Meetings (AGM), Meeting Fee (MF), and the CEO’s Duality Status 
(DS).  
 
Table 2: Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Variables Symbols Description 
Board Size BODS Count to the numbers of Directors on Board 
Board Remunerations BRUM Paid up amounts to Board Members for their services 
Audit Committee  Mem-
bers 
ACM Count to the numbers of Audit Committee 
Auditor's Remunerations ARUM Paid up amounts to Audit Committee Members for their 
services 
Annual General Meetings AGM Count to the numbers of meetings held 
Meeting Fee MF Fee paid to the members against the meeting charges 
Duality Status DS If a person occupies more than one post then 0 other-
wise 1 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
 
Dummy Variables 
The study incorporated the utilization of the dummy variables, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7, d8, and 
d9 representing the time fixed effect within the framework. 
Econometrical Framework and Modeling 
The study incorporated the utilization time fixed and location fixed effects, the multiple re-
gression approach deducing the results. 
Model Specification 
The study utilized time fixed and location fixed effects utilizing the multiple regression ana-
lytical approach for the estimation of the firm’s data.  
 
Empirical Results 
Description to Variables 
The study upon the corporate governance and the firm’s performance introduce the set of 
fundamental variables named as, BODS, BRUM, ACM, ARUM, AGM, MF, and DS. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum 
BODS 7.19 6 10 
BRUM 9447507.1 0 99608400 
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Variables Mean Minimum Maximum
ACM 3.33 3 4 
ARUM 1286394.1 1335 3250000 
AGM 5.43 4 18 
MF 254103.05 0 4500060 
DS 0.46 0 1 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
 
Table 3 depicts the proximity to the count number of Directors on Board (BODS) upon an 
average was founded to be around 7 members. The mean value of the remunerations associated with 
the BOD representing the BRUM is the approximate mean remunerations that the firms bear upon 
an average of 94 lacks for each firm. It is the average amount by which the BOD’s are being paid by 
their nascent firms. 
While considering the approximate number of ACM’s to be around 3, the remunerations as-
sociated with the ACM’s founded to be approximately around the rupees 12 lac that upon an aver-
age paid by the each firm. 
Further the results deduced that, upon an average, the approximately 5 meetings were orga-
nized by each listed firm. Approximately 2 lack rupees paid against the MF to the members by the 
firms. The descriptive analytical statistics for the DS revealed that more than 45% of firms, more 
than one post occupied by the same person. 
Table 4 indicated that the firms, upon an average, receiving the profitable returns in term of 
the assets. The value of the variable ROA, 5.27 indicating the gain by the firms in term of the re-
turns upon an average is more than 5 times as compared to the initial assets invested within the 
firms. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics to Performance Variables 
Variables Mean Minimum Maximum 
ROA 5.27 0.06 17.68 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
 
Fixed Effect Regression 
The empirical evaluation of the raw facts was followed by the descriptive analytical statis-
tics, by specifically utilizing the statistical and econometrical techniques to compare changes in 
compliance for 2009 to 2017 followed by the norms of the fixed effect model for both the individual 
and the time fixed effects. F-test reporting the significance of change. 
The r-square and the adjusted r-squares are then defining the model fittings along with the 
detailed significances and the estimate results of the coefficients of the fixed effects, for both the 
time and individual fixed effects.  
ROA as Dependent 
When ROA was considered, the regression framework adopted the appropriate methodologi-
cal approaches for handling the fixed effect regression models, the time fixed effect, individual fixed 
effects and the interactions among them.  
Time Fixed Effect 
The time fixed effect for the impact estimation of the governance variables upon the perfor-
mance variables indulged the variables (dummy), d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7, d8, and d9 respectively. The 
results of time fixed effect regression among the variables is presented within table 5. 
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Table 5: Time Fixed Model Estimation with Dependent ROA 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
 
The regression results indicated that the dummy variables utilized within the methodological 
framework i.e. d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7, d8, and d9 with ROA and the governance variables (BODS, 
BRUM, ACM, ARUM, AGM, MF and DS) having the insignificant results that actually presented 
within table 6. 
Individual Firm’s Fixed Effect 
The incorporation of the dummies with respect to the individual firms provided a number of 
variables i.e. d10, d11, d12, d13, d14, d15, d16, till d48, respectively. The results of individual 




                                                                              
       _cons    -12.54227   1.307916    -9.59   0.000    -15.11479   -9.969753
          d9     -.470318   .5409518    -0.87   0.385    -1.534308    .5936716
          d8    -.3927889   .5492695    -0.72   0.475    -1.473138    .6875605
          d7    -.4872211   .5388009    -0.90   0.366     -1.54698    .5725379
          d6    -.2655267   .5434633    -0.49   0.625    -1.334456    .8034026
          d5     -.355669   .5454751    -0.65   0.515    -1.428555    .7172173
          d4     .1040674   .5440731     0.19   0.848    -.9660613    1.174196
          d3    -.1813372   .5408933    -0.34   0.738    -1.245212    .8825372
          d2    -.1273218   .5394032    -0.24   0.814    -1.188265    .9336217
          DS    -.1621181    .257384    -0.63   0.529    -.6683626    .3441263
          MF     2.08e-07   1.67e-07     1.24   0.215    -1.21e-07    5.37e-07
         AGM     .1687584   .0470924     3.58   0.000     .0761332    .2613837
        ARUM     9.96e-07   1.47e-07     6.80   0.000     7.08e-07    1.28e-06
         ACM     1.887922   .3057346     6.18   0.000     1.286577    2.489266
        BRUM     6.37e-08   6.46e-09     9.86   0.000     5.10e-08    7.64e-08
        BODS     1.252833   .1405376     8.91   0.000     .9764114    1.529254
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6162.47065   359  17.1656564           Root MSE      =  2.4001
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.6644
    Residual    1981.61301   344  5.76050292           R-squared     =  0.6784
       Model    4180.85765    15  278.723843           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 15,   344) =   48.39
      Source         SS df MS Number of obs = 360
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Table 6: Individual Fixed Model Estimation with Dependent ROA 
 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
 
  more  
                                                                              
       _cons     -12.5622   1.190242   -10.55   0.000     -14.9032   -10.22121
         d48            0  (omitted)
         d47            0  (omitted)
         d46            0  (omitted)
         d45            0  (omitted)
         d44            0  (omitted)
         d43            0  (omitted)
         d42            0  (omitted)
         d41            0  (omitted)
         d40    -1.703946   .7776799    -2.19   0.029    -3.233505   -.1743861
         d39            0  (omitted)
         d38            0  (omitted)
         d37            0  (omitted)
         d36            0  (omitted)
         d35            0  (omitted)
         d34            0  (omitted)
         d33            0  (omitted)
         d32            0  (omitted)
         d31            0  (omitted)
         d30            0  (omitted)
         d29     2.337928   .7626388     3.07   0.002     .8379515    3.837904
         d28            0  (omitted)
         d27    -1.974753   .7659336    -2.58   0.010     -3.48121   -.4682966
         d26            0  (omitted)
         d25     3.079082   .7668122     4.02   0.000     1.570897    4.587266
         d24            0  (omitted)
         d23            0  (omitted)
         d22            0  (omitted)
         d21            0  (omitted)
         d20            0  (omitted)
         d19            0  (omitted)
         d18    -2.291612   .7683516    -2.98   0.003    -3.802824   -.7803997
         d17            0  (omitted)
         d16            0  (omitted)
         d15            0  (omitted)
         d14            0  (omitted)
         d13            0  (omitted)
         d12            0  (omitted)
         d11            0  (omitted)
         d10            0  (omitted)
         CEO    -.1167373   .2404757    -0.49   0.628    -.5897108    .3562362
          MF     2.18e-07   1.55e-07     1.41   0.161    -8.72e-08    5.24e-07
         AGM     .1670119   .0440037     3.80   0.000     .0804644    .2535594
        ARUM     1.06e-06   1.39e-07     7.63   0.000     7.87e-07    1.33e-06
         ACM     1.939279   .2861391     6.78   0.000     1.376494    2.502065
        BRUM     6.39e-08   6.02e-09    10.61   0.000     5.20e-08    7.57e-08
        BODS     1.186515   .1311189     9.05   0.000     .9286274    1.444403
                                                                              
         ROA        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6162.47065   359  17.1656564           Root MSE      =  2.2492
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7053
    Residual    1755.50257   347   5.0590852           R-squared     =  0.7151
       Model    4406.96809    12  367.247341           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 12,   347) =   72.59
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     360
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The regression results indicated that the dummy variables utilized within the methodological 
framework i.e. d10, d11, d12, d13, d14, d15, d16, till d48 with ROA and the governance variables 
(BODS, BRUM, ACM, ARUM, AGM, MF and DS).  
Interactions among the Time and Individual Fixed Effect 
The interactions among the variables utilized by the time fixed effect and the individual 
fixed effect with dependent ROA has been presented in table 7. 
The actual independent variables (BODS, BRUM, ACM, ARUM, AGM, MF and DS) along 
with the dummy variables (d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7, d8, and d9) deduced from the time fixed effect for 
ROA and the dummies for individual effect (d10 to d48) shared the common intercept. 
 
Table 7: Interactions among the Time and Individual Fixed Effect with ROA 
ROA Coefficients St. Error T P>|t| 
BODS 1.8955 0.133 8.94*** 0 
BRUM 6.3409 6.0709 10.45*** 0 
ACM 1.9167 0.2882 6.65*** 0 
ARUM 1.0809 1.4109 7.71*** 0 
AGM 0.1673 0.0445 3.76*** 0 
MF 2.3909 1.5809 1.51 0.132 
DS -0.1355 0.2426 -0.56 0.577 
d18 -3.0645 0.865 -3.54*** 0 
d25 3.5143 0.859 4.09*** 0 
d27 -1.604 0.901 -1.78* 0.076 
d29 2.7048 0.893 3.30*** 0.003 
d40 -1.8783 0.848 -2.21** 0.028 
constant -12.3 1.239 -9.93*** 0 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
*, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 
ANOVA Table 
Table 8 expresses the ANOVA Statistics where the mean square values for both the regres-
sion and residual were, 222.08 and 5.07, respectively. 
 
Table 8: ANOVA Table with Dependent ROA 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 4441.67 20 222.08 43.75 0 
Regression 
Residual 1720.79 339 5.07     
Total 6162.47 359       
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Predictors: (Constant), BODS, BRUM, ACM, ARUM, AGM, MF, DS, and d2, d3, d4, d5, 
d6,…….d48 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
 
Furthermore the results indicated that at 1% level, the significant relationship among the 
both mechanisms that the F-statistics 43.75 (p = 0.000, < 0.01) as indicated in table 8. 
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Model Summary  
Table 9 depicts the model fitting as a result of the regression analysis. The results indicated 
that model is explaining 72% of the variations. 
Within the estimation BODS, BRUM, ACM, ARUM, AGM, MF, DS, and d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, 
till d48 were the predictors with dependent ROA. 
 
Table 9: Model Summary with Dependent ROA 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the Esti-
mate 
1 0.827 0.7208 0.7043 2.253 
Predictors: (Constant), BODS, BRUM, ACM, ARUM, AGM, MF, DS, and d2, d3, d4, d5, 
d6,…….d48 
b. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Author’s Own Calculations 
 
Conclusions 
The study primarily focused upon the textile spinning firms listed at KSE and firms are go-
verned under the rules and regulations carved by SEC of Pakistan. The study concluded that the go-
vernance based mechanisms carved by the SECP strongly affects the performance of the firms. 
Upon an average, the numbers of Board of Directors (BODS) of the listed spinning firms at KSE 
were found to be approximately 7. 
Similarly, the Audit Committee members (ACM) were found to be upon an average 3 in 
count belonging to the firms. Approximate numbers of meetings reported by the firms were 6 ap-
proximately and the Duality Status (DS) depicted that less than half of the sample population, 46% 
of the listed firms under study were found to be encouraging the duality status.  
The operational costs were found to be the sound contributor toward the achievements of the 
firms. Within our analysis, these operational costs were so to be known as the Board’s Remunera-
tions (BRUM), Auditor’s Remunerations (ARUM) and the Meeting Fee (MF) where upon an aver-
age the approximate spending of the firms were 90 lack rupees, 12 lack rupees and the 2.5 lack ru-
pees, respectively.  
High operational cost eventually contributed toward the higher payoffs to the firms by means 
of Return on Assets (ROA) where upon an average the firms attaining 5 times more than the initial 
investment in the case of ROA. 
The study further illuminates the need of improvements within the core governance based 
mechanisms, especially to create collaboration among different sects or the sectors of the economy. 
Furthermore, the remunerations to the governing agents should be raised, this eventually escalate the 
spirit of the agents to perform better and to achieve the optimality for their nascent firm. 
Importance must be drowning toward the apprehension by means of the interactions or the 
general meetings, among the shareholders and the managing authorities of the firms to maintain the 
harmony and also to create better understanding. 
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